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Marta Figueras – Joan Méndez 
Mark Wrathall is professor of Philosophy at the University of California, 
Riverside. His work focuses on phenomenology, existentialism, the 
philosophy of popular culture, and the philosophy of art. He is 
considered a leading interpreter of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. 
And he is author of books like How to Read Heidegger (2005) and 
Heidegger and Unconcealment: Truth, Language, History (2010).  
Professor Wrathall is currently editing The Cambridge Companion to 
Heidegger’s Being and Time (forthcoming 2012), and finishing up a book 
manuscript on Heidegger’s later work.  
Philosophy is often criticized, at least in Europe, for being too 
theoretical. And over the last century, it seems to have been confined to 
university classrooms. Now, at a time when the fragmentation of society 
and its values lead back to a reflection on the meaning of existence, the 
practical aspect of philosophy recovers the importance it had at its 
origins.  In this context, what use is philosophy? 
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Part of the problem with our world is that we are so instrumentally 
minded.  We value things to the extent that we can put them to use, 
exploit them, commodify them, and make them readily available for use 
and consumption.  In that context, I think part of the use of philosophy is 
that it is useless.  It’s not a science, and it won’t help us understand how 
to predict and explain the causal interactions of any domain of objects. 
It’s not a technology, and it won’t help us to control and dominate 
objects. Some would make philosophy into the “handmaid of the 
sciences,” and take as its task the teaching of critical reasoning skills, the 
clarification of concepts, the development of rules of reasoning.  But the 
justification for this rests ultimately on vestiges of the analytic/synthetic 
distinction, and the idea that there is a kind of conceptual analysis and 
reasoning process that is pure of any empirical content.  There’s no 
reason why scientists can’t teach the kind of thinking that’s needed in the 
empirical sciences, and do it in a way that’s receptive to and tailored to 
the demands of empirical research within their specific domain. So even 
this claim for a special usefulness for philosophy is suspect. 
What philosophy is very good at, by contrast, is questioning our 
assumptions about such things as use and usefulness, about our drive to 
instrumentalize the world.  This is just an example, but where the 
sciences seek to explain an object, break it down, reconfigure it, render it 
flexible and available for ready use, philosophy asks why we feel an urge 
to understand, explain, control, and reconfigure the world.  If usefulness 
is measured by the extent to which one advances such interest, 
philosophy is often the most useless of disciplines.  And, in fact, this 
oldest of reproaches against philosophy – that it “corrupts the youth” – is 
a recognition of this fact. 
And despite all this, people come to philosophy to explore their sense 
(usually a vague, inarticulate and inchoate sense) that something’s not 
right with the prevailing ways we make sense of the world.  If it’s living 
up to its promise, philosophy will help them make sense of this concern. 
 
Marta Figueras – Joan Méndez 
What would you say that philosophy has brought in your own life, beyond 
becoming an academic occupation or profession? 
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Through practice in any discipline, the world teaches us how to see things 
in a new way. Painters experience color and form and composition in the 
world around them differently, as a result of practice in putting the visual 
world on canvas.  Carpenters see grains and colors and textures 
differently as a result of bringing form to wood. I suppose that 
philosophers see meanings and ideas and justificatory or inferential 
relationships in a way that others do not.  I live in constant wonder at the 
background of meaning, the “logic” of existence that shapes the things 
and events I encounter.  I’d say that being a philosopher enriches my 
experience of art, of human events, of movies, of music, of love and 
friendship.  Beyond that, philosophy has given me the perfect excuse to 
spend my time in conversation with interesting people in interesting 
places around the world. 
 
Marta Figueras – Joan Méndez 
What kind of philosophy is practiced in the U.S.? Is the practical aspect 
of this discipline being emphasized? 
 
Mark Wrathall 
I’m afraid that, for most of the past century, philosophy in the U.S. has 
been very much removed from the actual lifes of people.  Analytic 
philosophy, which is the prevailing mode of philosophy in America, 
prides itself on its clear and rigorous style. And the level of technical 
proficiency in much of analytic philosophy is indeed very impressive. But 
the reality is that, without extensive training in philosophy, it’s very 
difficult for most people to understand what’s at stake in the analytic 
conversation. 
Now I’m a philosophical pluralist. I think it would be a mistake for 
anyone to try to dictate that philosophy should be done in this way or 
that; that it must deal with these issues or those; that it must employ this 
method or that; that it must adopt a particular style. It would be a 
profoundly unphilosophical attitude to try to dictate such things. And 
still, I worry that philosophy is not doing enough to draw the broader 
community into the conversation. Philosophy has a unique contribution to 
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make as we grapple with the important issues of our generation, and it 
would be a great shame if philosophers were to withdraw from the fray, 
or to speak only to each other.   
 
Marta Figueras – Joan Méndez 
So, If I understand correctly your words, you’re defending, in fact, the 
practical aspect of philosophy, as the unique use that philosophy could 
have is, maybe, thinking about “the important issues of our generation”. 
Is that right? 
 
Mark Wrathall 
Some of them, yes. I think the most important issues for each generation 
are the ones that challenge inherited practices and assumptions and ways 
of thinking.  You might call these “thought provoking” challenges, 
because they disrupt our usual ways of dealing with the world and force 
us to think. I suspect that the unique contribution of philosophy is in 
training us to endure in thoughtfulness – to linger in these moments of 
breakdown, rather than trying to return as quickly as possible to a 
mindless way of managing the situation.  From the perspective of 
calculative rationality, which wants to figure out how to control any 
situation as efficiently as possible, it is precisely that tendency to endure 
in thoughtfulness that makes philosophy appear so useless. And so 
philosophy (along with the other humanities), is increasingly called upon 
to prove that it can make a contribution to the larger global-technological-
economic order.  I can’t help but see this demand as an updated version 
of the oldest and longest standing accusation level led against 
philosophers.  This accusation is that philosophers, far from better 
equipping their students to function in society, “corrupt the youth” 
This is a serious accusation, for not just any possible way of forming a 
person’s dispositions, discriminatory capacities and tastes amounts to an 
education – it is of course possible to form a person in such a way that he 
or she is less, not more, able to act in accordance with what the situation 
calls for.  The opposite of an education is a corruption, where corruption 
is a way of forming an individual so as to under mine or destroy his or 
her skills, discriminatory capacities, and tastes.  And I’ve essentially 
acknowledged in what I’ve said to this point that an education in thinking 
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is almost by definition corrupting.  Heidegger, too, has acknowledged as 
much: “we of today especially can only learn if weal ways at the same 
time unlearn. . . . We can only learn to think if we unlearn from the 
ground up what thinking’s essence has been up until now.” 
But one should also distinguish two types of corruption – one type of 
corruption replaces understanding with a lack of understanding; another 
type of corruption replaces one kind of understanding with another kind 
of understanding.  Or to put it more precisely, a philosophical corruption 
replaces a sense for what’s  important in the world, with a sensibility for 
the contingency of the world.  By the standards of calculative thinking, 
such a Philosophical corruption may well produce a disutility.  It will 
almost certain make us less efficient, and thus reduce the value of our 
students to the global-technological economy.  What an education in 
thinking does offer is a higher estimation of the dignity of human beings.  
We are the beings who can take responsibility for our way of being in the 
world, rather than being driven by exigencies of efficiency, flexibility, 
and optionalization. 
 
Marta Figueras – Joan Méndez 
Do you think it is good to try to popularize philosophy? What risks do 




I draw a distinction between the institution of philosophy and the practice 
of philosophy.  For the institution of philosophy – the departments, 
research centers, societies, conferences, the journals and publishing arms 
of university presses – I think there’s a risk today if we don’t popularize 
philosophy. Universities and granting agencies are more and more 
focused on quantitative, demonstrable economic returns on their 
investments. I’m not sure this is a game that the institution of philosophy 
can win.  If the institution is to survive, it needs to shine – it needs to 
attract and draw people to it, and show that it matters in a way that isn’t 
easy to acknowledge within a straightforward cost-benefit analysis. 
For the practice of philosophy, on the other hand, I do think that there is a 
risk in trying to popularize philosophy.  Some philosophers worry about 
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“watering down” philosophy, about making it dumb enough for public 
consumption.  But that is not for me the concern. For me, the worry is 
instead the temptation to reduce philosophy to a menu of “positions” or 
viewpoints that can be taken up with respect to any particular problem.  
The practice of philosophy lives in a landscape that is unfamiliar to 
everyday, public forms of life. Or, to be more precise, philosophy thrives 
in experiencing the familiar and well-trod paths of everyday life as 
unfamiliar, as inviting new responses, as opening up on to previously 
unseen vistas.  The practice of philosophy involves a tentative, halting 
questioning that resists the temptation to fall back on familiar concepts 
and categories. In my experience, it works best amongst a small group of 
interlocutors, who trust each other and are not afraid to make mistakes, to 
be corrected, to wander into a dead end and painstakingly retrace their 
steps, etc. This practice is very difficult to maintain in a public setting. 
 
Marta Figueras – Joan Méndez 
This reminds me of the Kantian assertion: "You cannot learn philosophy, 
can only learn to philosophize." 
 
Mark Wrathall 
That’s very well put. Philosophy is a practice. It’s an attitude.  It’s a way 
of exploring and disclosing the world. The moment it becomes a set of 
propositions that one can learn, or a method that one can apply 
formulaically, it’s no longer philosophy – it’s dogma or science.   
 
Marta Figueras – Joan Méndez 
Metaphysics is perhaps one of the branches of Philosophy that could 
provide more light on the loss of the original meaning of existence, as 
latent (and so visible) today. From what perspective you are working so 
theoretical aspect but at the same time, so essential to our practical life? 
 
Mark Wrathall 
Yes, I agree. For those who are concerned about the emptiness and 
banality of contemporary life, I think a metaphysical inquiry into the 
structure of existence can be quite illuminating.  My own thinking often 
turns around this very issue.  I’m currently involved, for instance, in 
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trying to get clear about different ways of experiencing temporality. The 
nature of temporality is a very traditional metaphysical issue, but 
philosophers tend to focus on the temporality of causal interactions.  This 
misses completely the way that time structures the spaces and activities of 
everyday life.  When we are with friends and loved ones, when we are 
working, when we are at a music concert, when we experience the sacred, 
when we are lost in thought or remembrance – each of these experiences 
involves a different way of relating our involvement in the moment with 
our recollections and anticipations.  And they are incompatible with the 
increasingly pervasive temporality of contemporary life - the temporality 
of consumption, of experimenting with (but not committing to) options, 
of multi-tasking. 
 
Marta Figueras – Joan Méndez 
Do you think reading Martin Heidegger’s works could help us to analyze 
the actual moment of our societies? In which sense? 
 
Mark Wrathall 
I return again and again to Heidegger’s diagnosis of the pathologies of 
our technological age.  I think Heidegger was way ahead of everybody in 
recognizing and seeing what’s going on in our world.  There is no 
question that modern technology has brought tremendous benefits to 
human beings.  Technology has contributed to dramatic increases in 
health and wealth as it has improved the supply of the basic commodities 
of life – housing, food, clothing, as well as medicines, healthcare.  In 
addition, developments in technologies of transportation and 
communication have enriched our lives by bringing variety and opening 
up endless options for entertainment. 
Yet many people feel an ambivalence about technology, a certain malaise 
in the presence of the increasing technologization of every aspect of our 
lives. This ambivalence is captured nicely in a VCU Life Sciences Survey 
on public attitudes toward technology. In year after year of the survey, 
approximately 90% of Americans agree that “scientific research is 
essential for improving the quality of human lives,” and about the same 
percentage hold that, “on the whole, developments in new technology 
helped make society better.”And yet approximately 50% of Americans 
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surveyed consistently hold that “scientific research has created as many 
problems for society as it has solutions.” 
Moreover, the broad consensus view that science and technology improve 
life becomes much more divided when questions were asked about 
specific technologies like genetic therapy. Interestingly enough, the 
survey posed the question in terms of when “science goes too far.”  94% 
thought it would be “going too far” to use biotechnology to change a 
baby’s eye and hair color, for instance.  And 54% even believed it was 
“going too far” to use genetic therapy to reduce a baby’s risk of serious 
disease.  61% said they would be unlikely to use genetic therapies to slow 
down the process of aging (even though 92% said they believed that 
“new technology used in medicine allows people to live longer and 
better”). 
In a more personal, anecdotal level, many people I talk to express a 
feeling of oppression in the face of technology. They hate feeling driven 
to check email constantly, and yet they can’t resist the urge.  With 
considerable guilt, friends will report episodes of turning into internet 
surfing zombies – waking up from a cyber-coma to realize they’ve 
wasted a day or a night. We feel, in a myriad of small and subtle ways, 
that technology has invaded domains in which it doesn’t really belong, 
and from which it detracts.   
This ambivalence toward technology – this feeling of malaise even in the 
face of the undeniable benefits that technologization has brought – points 
to something important about our technological age.   
On Heidegger’s account of technology, the malaise is rooted in ontology 
– in a sense that we are distorting ourselves and the entities we encounter 
in the world by imposing on them a mode of being that doesn’t let them 
be in the way that is most the irown.  The problem with technology is a 
problem of boundaries – of recognizing what entities are allowed to be 
the irown by technology, and what entities are not; and then having the 
restraint (Verhaltenheit) not to force non-technological entities into a 
technological frame.  Heidegger calls the ability to respect such 
boundaries “having a free relationship to technology”. It amounts to 
learning to resist the demands of technology – indeed, to being no longer 
even subject to these demands where they would be inappropriate. 
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Marta Figueras – Joan Méndez 
I agree. But…when you talk about Heidegger, I notice you talk about the 
latest of his works. What’s about the ontology that Heidegger designs in 




Yes, I think so.  The way Heidegger analyzed the temporality of everyday 
existence in Being and Time lies at the root of a lot of the things I’ve been 
saying here.  And it’s also a topic of some of my current work.  Just one 
example – I’m very interested in the idea that different ways of 
organizing time give rise to different experiences of space.  I spoke last 
fall at a conference in Rome devoted to the problem of protecting sacred 
spaces.  I found Heidegger’s account of temporality to be very useful 
here. There is a particular temporal pattern that governs equipmental 
contexts – when I am using tools and raw materials to construct an object, 
for example, I am oriented toward the future by way of a definite 
expectation of what is going to result from my actions.  But that kind of 
expectation is not compatible with an experience of the sacred in a holy 
place or cathedral or mosque or whatever.  To be open to an experience 
of the sacred, one must be ready to be dis-oriented, to have one’s 
expectations altered.  That suggests that the protection of sacred spaces 
requires us to not introduce them into an economy of use, or think of 
them as somehow contributing to the quality of life. The sacred can’t 
remain sacred if it is turned into an option, and commodity that offers a 
particular quality of aesthetic experience. 
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